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Articles
Peter M. North* Hague Conventions and the
Reform of English Conflict of
Laws'
I. Introduction
Over twenty years ago, Horace Read said: "The first half of this
century has seen the emergence of legislation as the chief instrument
of change and innovation in the law".2 True though this comment
was in 1959, it has received added force in the common law world,
especially in the Commonwealth, by the 'explosion of law reform'
3
which has taken place since the mid-sixties. The creation of
permanent statutory law reform agencies has tilted the balance even
further towards legislation as the instrument of legal change. This is
for two reasons. Despite the occasional judicial attempt to jump the
legislative gun,4 the means of implementing proposals from law
reform commissions is by means of legislation, and this is assisted
by the practice of many such bodies of appending draft Bills to their
final reports. The fact that such agencies exist seems in recent years,
in England at least, to have caused the judges in a number of
instances to argue that major change in the law is not for them, but
for the legislature. For instance, Lord Simon of Glaisdale dissented
in the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Miliangos v.
George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., 5 which decided that English courts
*Fellow of Keble College, Oxford; Law Commissioner for England and Wales.
1. This is a slightly expanded version of the Sixth Horace E. Read Memorial
Lecture delivered at the Dalhousie Law School on 29th September 1980.
2. Read, "The programme in Legislation at Dalhousie Law School" (1959), 13 U.
Tor.L.J. 81
3. Gower, "Reflections on Law Reform" (1973), 23 U.Tor. L.J. 257
4. Levison v. Patent Carpet Cleaning Co. Ltd., [1978] Q.B. 69 where Lord
Denning, M.R., at p.79, said:
In such circumstances as here the Law Commission in 1975 recommended that a
term which exempts the stronger party from his ordinary common law liability
should not be given effect except when it is reasonable. . . and there is a bill
now before Parliament which gives effect to the test of reasonableness. This is a
gratifying piece of law reform: but I do not think we need wait for that bill to be
passed into law. You never knowv what may happen to a bill.
See now the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
5. [1976] A.C. 443
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could in future give judgment in foreign currencies, not just in
sterling, the foreign currency to be converted into sterling as at the
date when the court authorises enforcement of the judgment. In
Lord Simon's view:
'I do not think that this is a law reform which should or can be
properly imposed by judges; it is, on the contrary, essentially a
decision which demands a far wider range of review than is
available to courts following our traditional and valuable
adversary system - the sort of review compassed by an
interdepartmental committee' .6
This echoes the forceful approach of Lord Kilbrandon in a criminal
appeal to the House of Lords the previous year where he said:
'If there is one lesson which has been learned since the setting up
of the Law Commission it is this, that law reform by lawyers for
lawyers (unless in exceptionally technical matters) is not socially
acceptable. An alteration in a fundamental doctrine of our law
• . . could not properly be given effect to save after the widest
reference to interests, both social and intellectual, far transcend-
ing those available in the judicial committee of your Lordships'
House'. 7
More recently still, the House of Lords 8 has refused to alter the rule
that the English courts will not take jurisdiction over actions
concerning title to foreign land. 9 Lord Wilberforce took the view
that the nature of the rule 'does not favour revision (assuming such
to be logically desirable) by judicial decision, but rather by
legislation. '10
It may be noted that two of these recent House of Lords decisions
in which anxiety has been expressed about judicial law-making
concern issues in the conflict of laws. Here there is a further
dimension to the question of law reform - the desire to achieve
reform and harmonisation) through widespread international agree-
ment. Not only does such reform come about by legislation but by
legislation implementing an internationally agreed convention.
United Kingdom legislative practice with conflict of laws
conventions has been to turn the Convention rules into our
6. Ibid., at 480. A broadly based Working Party is, in fact, assisting the Law
Commission with further work in the field of foreign money liabilities; see Law
Commission Fourteenth Annual Report 1978-1979, Law Com. No. 97, para. 2.43
and Appendix 2.
7. D.P.P. V.Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653 at 700
8. Hesperides Hotels v. Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd., [1979] A.C. 509
9. British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mozambique, [ 1893] A.C. 602
10. [1979] A.C. 509 at 537
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traditional statutory form, rather than to have a short Act with the
Convention given effect to in a Schedule, as tends often to be done
in uniform substantive law conventions. 11
There are a number of international law reform bodies which over
the years have concerned themselves with matters of the conflict of
laws. Some of these have been regional, such as the developments
in Latin America in the Montevideo Treaties of 1889 and 1940 and
the Bustamante Code of 1928, the five Scandinavian Conventions
concluded between 1931 and 1934, the draft Benelux uniform laws
of 1951 and 1968, the work of the Council of Europe and, most
recently, the activities of the E.E.C. in the field of harmonisation of
private international law. 12 Other activity has been on a wider
international basis and some problems affecting the conflict of laws
have been dealt with by the Unidroit Institute in Rome, by the
United Nations in UNCITRAL and, again recently, by the
Commonwealth Secretariat, particularly in the field of recognition
of foreign judgments and child custody disputes. Undoubtedly,
however, the most significant international body in the field of
reform and harmonisation of the conflict of laws has been the Hague
Conference on Private International Law.
II. The Hague Conference of Private International Law
The idea of an international conference for the codification of
private international law had been actively fostered in the late
nineteenth century by the Italian scholar (and Foreign Minister)
Mancini. 13 This idea came to fruition some five years after his
death, with the first meeting of the Hague Conference of Private
International Law in 1893, under the chairmanship of the Dutch
11. E.g. transport conventions, see Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971; Carriage
of Passengers by Road Act 1974; and see the Uniform Laws on International Sales
Act 1967
12. See the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters (1968) and its amending Convention of 1978; and most
recently the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980)
13. For full accounts of the history of the Hague Conference, see Offerhaus, "La
Conference de la Haye de droit international priv6" (1959), 16 Annuaire Suisse de
droit international 27; van Hoogstraten, "The United Kingdom joins an
Uncommon Market: The Hague Conference on Private International Law" (1963),
12 I.C.L.Q. 148; Nadelmann, "The United States joins the Hague Conference on
Private International Law" (1965), 30 Law and Contemporary Problems 291;
Vitta, Hague Recueil des cours 126 (1969 1), 113, 133-152; Nadelmann,
"Multilateral Conventions in the Conflicts Field" (1972), 19 Netherlands Int. Law
Rev. 107
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scholar, Asser, who presided over the next three conferences as
well.14 The early work of the Conference between 1893 and 1904
resulted in the conclusion of conventions on marriage, divorce,
guardianship, the effects of marriage on the spouses' property
rights, judicial pronouncements of legal incapacity and civil
procedure. There was then a gap in the work of the Conference until
sessions in 1925 and 1928, but none of the Conventions agreed at
these two later sessions were ever brought into force. The early
work of the Conference had two particular inter-connected
characteristics. It was dominated by the principle of nationality as a
connecting factor, and was essentially a regional conference, being
restricted to European states. Indeed the early Conventions have
been scathingly criticised by Kahn-Freund as an expression of
'Continental European parochialism which mistook Europe for the
world'. 15
There was no meeting of the Conference after 1928 until its
renaissance in 1951 when the Member States laid down, in a
separate Treaty, a new statute for the Conference. They also
established the Permanent Bureau as a small full time secretariat
which operates under the guidance of the Netherlands Standing
Government Committee, described by a former Secretary-General
as 'the very heart of the Hague Conference'. 16 Since 1951 there
have been regular sessions of the conference, usually every four
years, which have resulted in the conclusion of nearly thirty
conventions. The membership of the Conference has grown and
diversified. No longer is it exclusively a Western European, civil
law based regional body. The membership of 29 countries includes
not only all the countries of Western Europe, both common and
civil law jurisdictions, but also Canada and the U.S.A., three South
American states (Argentina, Surinam, and Venezuela) as well as
Australia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Israel, Japan and Yugoslavia.
With this truly international membership has come the need, and
willingness, to bridge the often substantial legal differences
between the Member States, seen most forcibly in the abandonment
of nationality as the exclusive connecting factor. 17 Indeed the
movement away from Mancini's principle of nationality has been
14. 1894, 1900, 1904
15. Hague Recueil des cours 143 (1974 III) 139, 190
16. Van Hoogstraten, "The United Kingdom joins an Uncommon Market: The
Hague Conference on Private International Law" (1963), 12 I.C.L.Q. 148, 152
17. See de Winter, Hague Recueil des cours 128 (1969 111), 349
Hague Conventions 421
the price to be paid for a movement towards his other guiding
principle of universality. '
8
III. Canada and the Hague Conference
Canada joined the Hague Conference on October 7, 1968, but the
record of Canadian acceptance of Hague Conventions cannot be
described as impressive. Canada has never signed, ratified or
acceded to any Hague Convention, whether concluded before or
after Canada joined the deliberations of the Hague Conference. That
apparently gloomy picture can be lightened a little. Formal
accession by Canada to any convention concluded before 1968
poses very real difficulties because none of those earlier
conventions contains a federal-state clause in a form appropriate to
Canada's federal system. 19 Nevertheless, these earlier Hague
Conventions have not been wholly ignored in Canada. The main
arena for their consideration has been the annual meetings of the
Conference of Commissioners of Uniformity of Legislation in
Canada. This body, in whose work Horace Read played a prominent
and distinguished part for many years, produced the Uniform Wills
Act in 1929 and Part II of this Act dealt with the Conflict of Laws.
Despite the fact that this Part was revised in 195320, further
consideration was given in 1959 to the possibility of amending these
uniform provisions, 2' a project which was shelved the following
year when it became apparent that the Hague Conference would
consider the question of the formal validity of wills. 22 In 1961 the
Hague Conference concluded a Convention on the conflict of laws
relating to the form of testamentary dispositions and this
Convention was implemented in the United Kingdom by the Wills
Act 1963. In 1966 the uniformity commissioners substantially
adopted 23 that legislation as an amendment to that part of the
18. Vitta, Hague Recueil des cours 126 (1969 1), 113, 150
19. Proceedings of the Fifty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1973), at 124
20. Proceedings of the Thirty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1953), at 51. These
revised provisions were substantially enacted in Ontario (1954), Newfoundland
(1955), New Brunswick (1959), Alberta (1960), and British Columbia (1960).
21. Proceedings of the Forty-first Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1959), at 132-136
22. Proceedings of the Forty-second Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1960), at 90
23. Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1966), at 23-24, 131-140
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Uniform Wills Act dealing with the conflict of laws relating to
formal validity. However, only three Provinces2 4 have adopted
these reformed choice of law rules and the fact that the attempt to
implement the 1961 Hague Convention in Canada has been
relatively unsuccessful has been the source of some criticism. 25 One
reason is, perhaps, that the English model of the Wills Act 1963 fits
very uneasily into the present general structure of the Uniform Wills
Act. 26 Nevertheless, this work on the law of wills does provide a
legal landmark as the first attempt to translate into Canadian law the
substance of a Hague Convention. 
2 7
The conflict rules in the Uniform Wills Act are not the only
example of such activity and we must turn again to the work of the
Uniformity Commissioners, this time in the field of tort law. At the
Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law (1968) a convention was adopted on the law applicable to
traffic accidents and a report on this convention was considered by
the Uniformity Commissioners in 1970.28 They recommended the
adoption of a Uniform Conflict of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act
modelled on the Hague Convention. 29 Although this Uniform Act
has, so far, only formed the basis for legislation in the Yukon
Territory, 30 it marks a further step (albeit small) in the acceptance in
Canada of Hague Conventions.
Although no further legislative steps appear to have been taken to
implement other Hague Conventions in Canada, it should not be
assumed that Canada has abandoned interest in the work of the
Hague Conference. Far from it. Not only has Canada been most
effectively represented at all the Sessions of the Hague Conference
since 1968, close liaison has been established between the
Department of Justice and the Uniformity Commissioners so far as
24. Manitoba, Act to amend the Wills Act, 1975, ss. 37-44; Newfoundland, Wills
(Amendment) Act 1976, s. 1; and Ontario, Succession Law Reform Act 1977, ss.
34-41. See also the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Working Paper
No. 28: The Making and Revocation of Wills (1980), Chapter VII
25. Casswell, "The Conflict of Laws Rules Governing the Formal Validity of
Wills: Past Developments and Suggested Reform" (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall
L.Rev. 165
26. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, at 460-461
27. It is significant that the attempt was by the use of a model law, rather than
direct Canadian accession to the Convention under Article 16, and see infra.
28. Proceedings of the Fifty-second Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1970), at 38, 215-262
29. Ibid, at 40, 263-270
30. Conflict of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Ordinance, O.Y. 1972 (First Session) c.3
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advice in the preparation for the various meetings and in considering
the conventions which emerge are concerned, and to this end a
Special Committee on International Conventions on Private
International Law was set up in 1971.31 This Committee works
closely with the Department of Justice's Advisory Group on Private
International Law and Unification of Law.
So far as implementation is concerned, the work of these bodies
over the past few years seems to have led them to the following
conclusions. Direct implementation of Hague Conventions con-
cluded before Canada joined the Hague Conference will be
impossible because of the absence from those earlier conventions of
a satisfactory federal state clause. In virtually all the conventions
concluded from 1968 onwards, that problem has been overcome and
so the main issue has been to establish priority of treatment of these
various conventions and to decide what legislative action, federal or
provincial, would be necessary to implement them. Over the years
priority seems to have been given to examining the Conventions on
the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (1970),32 the
International Administration of Estates of Deceased Persons
(1973), 33 the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-judicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (1965) and on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (1970).
These last two conventions do not have federal state clauses but it is
thought that, in different ways, this problem could be overcome. 34
Certainly, detailed consideration has been given to the ways in
which they could be implemented in the Provinces. 35
There are undoubted problems for a federal state, such as
Canada, in ratifying and implementing international conventions in
3 1. See e.g., Proceedings of the Fifty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1973), at 125
32. Though this may have to await revision of the Divorce Act 1968, see
Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1973), at 125
33. This is being examined by the Ontario Law Reform Commission; see their
Thirteenth Annual Report, 1979, p. 12. The Ontario Law Reform Commission has
also examined the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability
(1972) but has concluded that the approach of the Convention should not be
adopted for the reform of the Ontario choice of law rules relating to products
liability, see Report on Products Liability (1979), at 116-117
34. See Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1978), at 167, 170
35. See Proceedings of the Sixty-First Annual Meeting of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1979), at 232-304
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the field of private law. They have been explained by others far
more competent in federal constitutional law than 1.36 Although the
mixture of legal systems in the United Kingdom creates some
complexities in this field, they have not been very great and have
not prevented the United Kingdom from ratifying and implementing
a number of Hague Conventions. Assuming that the particular
consitutional difficulties in Canada can be overcome, are there
lessons that Canada may learn from the British experience of Hague
Conventions as a means of reforming the conflict of laws? It is to
this question that I want to devote the rest of my lecture.
IV. The United Kingdom and the Hague Conference
The history of United Kingdom participation in the work of the
Hague Conference is much longer than that of Canada. 37 The
British government declined an invitation in 1892 from the Dutch
government to join the Conference at its inception; but in 1925, the
United Kingdom, though not a member, sent a delegation to the
Session of the Hague Conference held that year, but they did not
stay for the whole session and did not sign the Final Act. Their
stamina had improved by the time of the Sixth Session in 1928 when
they not only sent in written observations, but also attended and
indeed signed the Final Act. As we have seen, there was then a gap
of over twenty years in the activities of the Hague Conference, until
it was resuscitated with the Seventh Session in 1951, the year in
which the Statute under which it operates was laid down. From that
Session onwards, a British delegation has always attended the
proceedings. It was not, however, until 15 July 1955 that the United
Kingdom formally joined the Hague Conference. Since 1951, there
have been seven sessions of the Hague Conference (the next, the
Fourteenth, is due to start next month) and these have produced
some twenty-six Conventions of which all but nine are in force.
36. See Castel, "Canada and the Hague Conference on Private International Law:
1893-1967" (1967), 45 Can.Bar Rev. 1, 23-31; Proceedings of the Fifty-Second
Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation
in Canada (1970), at 157-176, 206-214; Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual
Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in
Canada (1975), at 120-123; Fischer, "The Convention on the Law Applicable to
Products Liability" (1974), 20 McGill L.J. 44, at 73-76; Glenn, "Conflict of Laws
- the 1976 Hague Conventions on Marriage and Matrimonial Property Regimes"
(1977), 55 Can. Bar Rev. 586, 594-595,604-605
37. The earlier history has been well catalogued by van Hoogstraten, "The United
Kingdom joins an Uncommon Market: The Hague Conference on Private
International Law" (1963), 12 I.C.L.Q. 148
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However, the United Kingdom has not acceded to any of the four
concluded before it formally joined the Hague Conference and, of
the others, has ratified (and implemented) only seven and signed
one other. This might be compared with the records of such
countries as France which has ratified 15 and signed 2, the
Netherlands which has ratified 12 and signed 6 and Portugal which
has ratified 10 and signed 6. In defence of the United Kingdom's
failure to sign, though not to ratify, is the fact that there is a
difference in approach between foreign ministries to the question of
signature of international conventions. Some countries take the
view that it is desirable to sign as soon as possible as a gesture of
international goodwill even though the prospects of ultimate
ratification may not be great; others only sign when there is a real
prospect of ratification and implementation. This latter tends to be
the British approach 38 and the implementation of the one Hague
Convention that the United Kingdom has signed but not ratified
(that on the International Administration of the Estates of Deceased
Persons (1973)) has been under consideration for some time now.39
This is not the place to examine in detail the merits and demerits
of all the post-war Hague Conventions and I intend to concentrate
primarily on those which the United Kingdom has ratified.
However, that leaves nearly 20 Conventions in which the United
Kingdom has shown no interest in their implementation. But before
undue criticism is levelled at those in the United Kingdom
concerned with the conflict of laws for this lack of interest, it should
be pointed out that there are two groups of conventions which have
not yet entered into force. The first group is five conventions
concluded up to 196540 which can only muster six ratifications
between them and none of which has been signed or ratified by the
United Kingdom. The second group of conventions are those
resulting from the work of the Thirteenth Session in 1976, 41 none of
38. See Hansard, H.C. Deb. Vol. 816 c.1555 (1971); H.L. Deb. Vol.360, c.40
39. See e.g. the Eighth Annual Report of the Law Commission, 1972-1973, Law
Com. No. 58, para. 64, and the Fourteenth Annual Report of the Law Commission,
1978-1979, Law Com. No. 97, para. 2.47
40. Convention sur la loi applicable au transfert de la proprid6t en cas de vente '
caractere international d'objets mobiliers corporels (1958); Convention sur Ia
competence du for contractuel en cas de vente a caractere international d'objets
mobiliers corporels (1958); Convention pour r6gler les conflits entre la loi nationale
et la loi du domicile (1955); Convention concernant la reconnaissance de la
personalit6 juridique des soci&tls, associations et fondations 6trangeres (1956);
Convention on the Choice of Court (1965)
41. Convention on the law applicable to matrimonial property regimes;
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which has yet received the necessary number of ratifications to
bring it into force. 42 The really successful conventions, which the
United Kingdom has not ratified, stem from the earlier period of
post-war activity of the Hague Conference, namely those on civil
procedure (1954) 43, on the law applicable to maintenance
obligations towards children (1956) 44 and on the recognition and
enforcement of decisions relating to such obligations (1958).45
It will become that the United Kingdom's experience of Hague
Conventions is mixed. If success is measured in terms of
implementation, then some types of convention have been more
successful than others. Furthermore the chances of ratification and
implementation are greatly enhanced if certain factors are present.
So let us turn to consider the impact of Hague Conventions on
reform of the conflict of laws in the United Kingdom and to
examine what seem to be the characteristics of successful, and
unsuccessful, conventions.
V. Impetus or sterilisation?
A strong argument in favour of the work of the Hague Conference in
the context of law reform is the impetus that it provides. It may well
be that attempts by interested parties have failed to convince either
the government or the legislature of the need for reform of some
particular conflict of laws rules. If the Hague Conference produces a
convention, it may then become that much easier, not only to point
out that others have seen the need for change, but also to suggest
that a legislative vehicle, or at least its chassis, is available in the
form of the convention. An example of such fortuitous timing of a
Convention on celebration and recognition of the validity of marriages; Convention
on the law applicable to agency
42. The one other convention not in force has been signed by the United Kingdom,
the Convention on the international administration of the estates of deceased
persons (1972). There is also one other Convention and a Protocol thereto
(Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (1971), and the Supplementary Protocol to this Convention
(1971)) which is of little consequence because, though in force, only two countries
(the Netherlands and Cyprus) have ratified it.
43. Convention relative 4 la procedure civile (1954), ratified or acceded to by 20
Member States and by 7 others.
44. Convention sur la loi applicable aux obligations alimentaires envers les enfants
(1956), ratified by 12 Member States.
45. Convention concernant la reconnaissance et l'ex~cution des decisions en
matiere d'obligations alimentaires envers les enfants (1958), ratified or acceded to
by 16 Member States.
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Hague convention can be provided in the field of family law. In
1968, the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference produced a
convention on the recognition of divorces and legal separations.
This was finally concluded in 1970 and early in that year the Law
Commission and Scottish Law Commission were asked to advise on
the necessary legislation to permit the United Kingdom Government
to ratify the Convention which, on 19 May 1970, it announced its
intention of doing. 46 By November 1970, the two Commissions had
reported47 with a draft Bill appended to their report; the Recognition
of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 received the Royal
Assent on 27 July 1971 and came into force on 1 January 1972.
Very speedy work, motivated you might think by international
pressure on the United Kingdom. Not a bit of it. The Divorce
Convention requires three ratifications to bring it into force, 48 but,
at the time when the Law Commissions were asked to examine the
Divorce Convention, no state had ratified it and only the United
Kingdom had signed it. It did not come into force until August 24
1975. 49 Indeed it was said during the debates on the Bill, "We are
leading the world in legislating to give effect to the intent of the
Convention." 50 The reason for all the interest is to be found in the
House of Lords' decision on recognition of foreign divorces in
Indyka v. Indyka .51 Although it liberalised the jurisdictional bases
on which courts would recognise foreign divorce decrees by
providing that all that was required was that one spouse should have
had a 'real and substantial connection' with the country where the
divorce was obtained, the decision brought a great deal of
uncertainty in its wake for which it attracted substantial criticism.
52
46. The United Kingdom signed the Convention on 1 June 1970 and ratified it on
21 May 1974.
47. Law Com. No. 34; Scot. Law Com. No. 16 (1970)
48. Art. 27
49. The three ratifications then were Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Since then it has also been ratified by Finland, Norway, Switzerland and
Czechoslavakia.
50. Hansard, H.C. Deb. Vol. 821, cc. 165-166. The Solicitor-General said: "We
are blazing the trail for other countries by passing these provisions into our
domestic law"; Ibid., c. 168
51. [1969] 1 A.C. 33. Judgment was actually given in May 1967. The decision has
been widely applied in Canada, see Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laivs, Vol. II at
327.
52. See e.g. North, "Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees" (1968), 31
M.L.R. 257, 283, and see Lipstein, [1967] C.L.J 182; Hansard H.L. Deb. Vol.
315, c.485; Hansard, H.C. Deb. Vol. 816, c. 1549
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During its passage through Parliament, the Bill implementing the
Divorce Convention was continually referred to as a major measure
of law reform. Mention was also made in Parliament of the work of
the Hague Conference and in fairly dramatic terms, such as that the
problem of divorce recognition made 'international agreement
imperative'. 53 However, this was pretty specious reasoning
because, although the recognition rules of the Divorce Convention
are based on reciprocity, the clear view was expressed in Parliament
that the Bill should not be limited to the recognition of divorces
obtained in countries which were parties to the Divorce Convention,
for, indeed, at that time there were no other parties.
54
The Divorce Convention coincided with a pressing domestic need
for reform of the divorce recognition rules. The Convention,
combined with the report and draft legislation of the two Law
Commissions, provided the necessary impetus for legislative time to
be made available to cure what was generally regarded as a defect in
the law.
Another example of an impetus for domestic law reform being
provided by a Hague Convention is seen in the field of adoption.
The Adoption Act 1968 was passed in the United Kingdom to
implement the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law
and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoption (1965). The 1968
Act was drafted in an appallingly complex manner, so much so that
some years ago I expressed the view 'that it is hoped that it may
never be brought into force'. 55 Parts of the 1968 Act dealing with
jurisdiction were repealed and replaced by simpler provisions
56
before the Convention was eventually ratified and brought into force
in 1978. The Convention itself has had little direct effect on the
English rules as to jurisdiction and recognition of foreign adoptions
because it only applies as between States parties to it and they
number only two (Austria and Switzerland) in addition to the United
Kingdom. However, not only did the legislation implementing the
Convention rules also provide some amendment to the jurisdictional
rules for non-Convention cases, it made far-reaching changes in the
53. Hansard, H.L. Deb. Vol. 315, c.485; and see H.C. Deb. Vol.816, c. 1548
54. Hansard, H.L. Deb. Vol. 315, c. 492; H.C. Deb. Vol. 816, cc.1554, 1555
55. Cheshire, Private International Law, 9th ed. p. 467; a Canadian commentator
was similarly critical, regarding the probable value of the Convention as 'very
small in relation to the technicality and awkwardness which courts would encounter
in making adoptions under the Convention': Blom "The Adoption Act 1968 and
the Conflict of Laws" (1973), 22 I.C.L.Q. 109, 153
56. Children Act, 1975, s. 24
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English recognition rules. The 1968 Act gave the Secretary of State
power to designate foreign adoptions as 'overseas adoptions',
whose recognition in England is to all intents and purposes
automatic, and such adoptions are to be given the same incidents
and effects as if they were English adoptions. This procedure has
been applied to adoptions in a large number of Commonwealth
countries (including Canada), the U.S.A., South Africa, and all
Western European countries. 57 Recognition of Austrian and Swiss
adoptions is, in this context, insignificant but the decision to
implement the Adoption Convention led to legislation of much
greater significance.
Unfortunately, the work of the Hague Conference can also have a
completely opposite effect on the reform of the conflict of laws. Far
from being an impetus, it can prove to be a source of unfortunate
and, in the event, totally unproductive delay. It can have a
sterilising effect. This aspect can be illustrated by a more recent
Hague Convention, still in the field of family law, namely the
Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of
Marriages, one of the fruits of the 1976 Session. To appreciate the
impact, or rather lack thereof, of this Convention on law reform, I
need to take you back a few years in the work of the English Law
Commission. From the earliest days, family law, including its
conflict rules, loomed large in the work of the Commission. As we
have seen, recognition of foreign divorces and legal separations was
the subject of legislation in 1971;58 the next year saw the courts
being given wide jurisdiction over polygamous marriages. 59 In
1973, new jurisdictional rules for all matrimonial causes were laid
down60 and a Working Paper was published on the question of the
jurisdiction and scope of declarations as to status. 61 Two major
topics in the family law area of conflict of laws remained -
recognition of foreign nullity decrees and choice of law in marriage.
Work had proceeded on these topics in both Commissions for two or
three years and two draft Working Papers were produced for
internal discussion. However, in 1973, it became known that the
agenda for the 1976 Session of the Hague Conference was to
57. S.I. 1973, No. 19
58. Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971
59. Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972; see now the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.47
60. Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973
61. Working Paper No. 48 (1973)
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include the topic of 'the conflict of laws in respect of marriage...
to include, as the case may be, questions relating to the recognition
abroad of decisions in respect of the existence or validity of
marriages.' In the light of this, the two Commissions suspended
their work in this field, convinced that 'satisfactory reform can only
be achieved with international agreement'.62 It is undoubtedly true
that the problem of limping marriages can best be cured by
international agreement - provided satisfactory international
agreement can be reached.
What then happened in the 1976 Session of the Hague
Conference to the two problems on which United Kingdom law
reformers had suspended work three years earlier? Despite the
submission by the United Kingdom of a whole draft Part of a
Convention to cover the topic, 63 recognition of foreign nullity
decrees was excluded from the work of the Conference. To deal
with this topic was thought to create more problems than could be
solved 64 - what some might regard as a counsel of despair. While
it is true that nullity recognition raises fewer problems than divorce,
there is, in England, a steady trickle of such cases65 and, indeed, the
common law rules to be applied to them are now in some doubt
since both the English nullity jurisdictional rules and the divorce
recognition rules have been changed. 66
Was there any greater success in 1976 in providing a
comprehensive set of choice of law rules for marriage? A
Convention certainly emerged from the deliberations of the 1976
Session, but this Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the
Validity of Marriage has not met with immediate acclaim. While
four states have signed it, 67 as yet none have ratified. Appraisal of
the convention by commentators has not been over-enthusiastic
68
62. Law Commission Eighth Annual Report 1972-1973, Law Com. No. 58, para.
49
63. It was modelled on the 1970 Divorce Recognition Convention.
64. See Actes et Documents de la Treizieme session de la Conf&ence de La Haye
de droit international priv6, Vol. I, at 122-123, 292
65. E.g. Law v. Gustin, [1976] Fam. 155; Perrini v. Perrini, [1979] Fam. 84
66. See Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 10th ed., at 380-384; North,
Private International Law of Matrimonial Causes, Chapter 12; Cheshire and North,
Private International Law, 10th ed., at 406-416, and see Smith, "The Recognition
of Foreign Nullity Decrees" (1980), 96 L.Q.R. 380
67. Australia, Egypt, Luxembourg, Portugal
68. See Batiffol, "La troizibme session de ]a Conf6rence de la Haye de droit
international priv6" (1977), Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 66, 451, 467-482; Glenn,
"Conflict of Laws - The 1976 Hague Conventions on Marriage and Matrimonial
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and indeed somewhat critical69. While the Convention may be an
effective measure of harmonisation, it is far less appropriate as a
measure of law reform. If the latter characteristic is lacking, the
chances for the implementation of a substantive choice of law
convention 70 are not great. A brief examination of the convention
may reveal why it is not an effective law reform measure. The
Convention falls into two main parts. Chapter 1, which is optional,
deals with the rules for the celebration of marriage in a Contracting
State. The basic rule for formal requirements is that they are to be
governed by the law of the place of celebration. In the case of
essential validity, the Convention provides that a marriage must be
celebrated in a Contracting State if the prospective spouses satisfy
the substantive requirements of the internal law of that state and one
of them habitually resides there or is a national thereof, or if the
spouses satisfy the substantive requirements of the law applicable
under the choice of law rules, whatever they may be, of the State of
celebration. Not only does this Chapter provide a substantial inroad
into the rule that a state will normally require all the requirements of
its marriage law, formal and essential, to be complied with before a
marriage can be celebrated there, but it also falls far short of
providing a complete code of choice of law rules for marriage in that
State.
The same criticism can be made of Chapter II, which is not
optional, and which deals with the recognition of the validity of a
marriage celebrated in another Contracting State. Its basic rule is
that a marriage which is validly entered into under the law of the
state of celebration shall be regarded as valid in all other
Contracting States. Again this falls far short of a choice of law code
for foreign marriages. Both chapters leave a large number of issues
still dependent on the unharmonised and unreformed choice of law
rules of the individual states. For example, Chapter I preserves,
without defining, the choice of law rules of the state of celebration 7'
Property Regimes" (1977), 55 Can. Bar Rev. 586, 588-595; Lalive, "La
Convention de ]a Haye du 14 mars 1978 sur la c6l~bration et la reconnaissance de ]a
validit6 des mariages" (1978), 34 Annuaire Suisse de droit international 31
69. E.g., Reese, "The Thirteenth Session of the Hague Conference" (1977), 25
Am.Jo.Comp.Law 393, 394; "The Hague Convention on Celebration and
Recognition of the Validity of Marriages" (1979) 20 Virginia J. of Int. Law 25,
35-36.
70. The difference between subtantive and procedural conventions is discussed
further, infra.
71. Art. 3(2)
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and Chapter II only applies to the recognition of marriages which
are valid under the law of the state of celebration. Recognition of
marriages invalid under that law, but essentially valid under, say,
the law of the domicile, is left to the unamended choice of law rules
of the individual states.
It seems to me very doubtful whether such a Convention alone
would be regarded as meeting the need for reform of the choice of
law rules relating to marriage. If the incomplete rules in the
Convention were regarded as meritorious, then of course they could
be included as part of a legislative law reform package; thereby
achieving the twin aims of desired reform and at least some
international harmonisation. If the Convention rules are, however,
regarded as providing little improvement in the present choice of
law rules and certainly not providing a model for more broadly
based reform (as I believe to be the case here), then the Convention
is in many ways counter-productive.
What then has the Marriage Convention achieved so far as reform
of English law is concerned? The answer must be - very little.
Work has been suspended for about seven years on the two issues of
choice of law in marriage and the recognition of foreign nullity
decrees. There are no Convention rules on the latter topic and those
on the former are not very satisfactory in themselves and certainly
do not provide a complete choice of law code for marriage. The
Law Commissions have now recently returned to one of these
topics, (foreign nullity decrees) 72 as the subject of law reform
within the United Kingdom. Satisfactory international law reform
and harmonisation of this sensitive topic has proved elusive. The
Hague Conventions early this century on marriage and divorce 73
were not very successful and it may be that these areas of family law
impinge so directly on the social and cultural structure of individual
states that the compromises necessary for international agreement
really satisfy no-one. 74 I am not intending to suggest that
72. See Law Commission. Fourteenth Annual Report 1978-1979, Law Com. No.
97, para. 2.46. No final decision has yet been taken as to what to do about choice of
law for marriage.
73. Convention pour rrgler les conflits de lois en matiere de mariage (1902);
Convention pour rrgler les conflits de lois et de jurisdictions en mati~re de divorce
et de separation de corps (1902). For the reasons for their lack of success, see de
Winter, Hague Recueil des cours 128 (1969 III), 347, 376-383; Wolff, Private
International Law, 2nd ed., at 50, 313; Palsson, Marriage and Divorce in
Comparative Conflict of Laws, at 29-30
74. The dangers of compromise are discussed infra.
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international uniformity is not a desirable goal, quite the contrary.
But it is often difficult to achieve, and unsuccessful attempts mean
the postponement of other law reform activities in that field.
VI. International agreement as a necessary medium for national
law reform
Not only may the impetus for national reform come from
international activity, as we have seen, 75 it may indeed only be
possible to achieve national reform through the medium of
international agreement. 76 Two examples may be given where the
need for reform of national law seemed only to be realisable through
a Hague Convention. The first example, that of the formal validity
of wills, led to successful law reform; the second example is the less
happy one of attempts to reform the law of domicile.
The Hague Convention on the Conflict of Laws Relating to the
Form of Testamentary Dispositions was concluded in 1961 and
provides, like divorce, another example of a happily timed
Convention. It dealt with an area of law which was in need of
reform both in England and in other common law jurisdictions. It
provided the impetus for the English Wills Act 1963 and, as we
have seen, 77 some Canadian Provinces soon followed suit, as did a
number of Australian States78 .
So far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the need for reform
of the conflict of laws relating to wills was clear. Until the 1963 Act
the formal validity of a will had depended on Lord Kingsdown's Act
of 1861. This Act had improved on the rigid common law position
that the formal validity of a will of movables was governed by the
testator's domicile on death by also permitting validation of the
wills of British Subjects under the law of the country where the will
was made, or, if the will was made outside the United Kingdom,
under the law of the domicile at the time of making the will. This set
75. Discussed supra.
76. It has been said by Graveson, "The International Unification of Law" (1968),
16 Am. Jo. Comp. Law 4, 7, that:
It may appear that the only way to achieve an internal reform of law is through
the international unification of the particular branch of law, so that the local law
is reformed and assimilated to an international pattern achieved through some
convention, and the political weakness of local or national opinion is fortified
by the international opinion which lies behind an acceptable international
project.
77. See supra.
78. Nygh, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., at 480-481
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of criteria for formal validity had long been criticised, 79 especially
as it was confined to the wills of British subjects and drew an
unhappy distinction between wills made in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere. However, nothing was done. The electoral appeal of the
reform of the conflict rules relating to wills was not great! Then, in
1956 at the Eighth Hague Conference the United Kingdom took the
initiative in instigating the consideration of the formal validity of
wills by the Hague Conference at its Ninth Session in 1960.80
Furthermore, in 1958, the Lord Chancellor's Private International
Law Committee reported 8' that the law was undoubtedly in need of
reform and should be changed along lines very similar to those
which emerged in the Hague Convention agreed at the 1960
Session, namely that all wills, whether or not of British subjects,
whether relating to movables or immovables, and whether made in
the United Kingdom or elsewhere, should be formally valid if valid
under any one of the following laws, namely that of the place where
it was made, of the testator's domicile at the time of making or of
death, or of the testator's nationality at the time the will was made
or at death. Additionally, a will of immovables would be formally
valid under the lex situs. All of these grounds were accepted in the
Hague Convention, but reference to the testator's habitual residence
at the time of making the will or at death was also added.
This Convention achieved the twin objectives of providing much
needed reform at home and also widespread international
agreement. Not only have fifteen countries ratified it, another seven
countries not parties to the Hague Conference have acceded to it;
and, as we have seen, it has been relied on for the reform of the law
in countries which have not become parties to the Convention. Like
divorce, the need for reform existed already; the Hague Conference
agreed with the United Kingdom's general approach. International
agreement meant that legislative interest, and thus time, was
provided. Indeed, the Bill which became the Wills Act 1963 passed
through both Houses of Parliament virtually without debate. 82
The Wills Convention provides a striking example, by its
substantial implementation in parts of Canada and Australia, of
79. E.g. Morris, "The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes" (1946), 62 L.Q.R. 170,
173-176
80. See Graveson, "The Ninth Hague Conference of Private International Law"
(1961), 10I.C.L.Q. 18, 21-22
81. Fourth Report, Cmd. 491 (1958)
82. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 251, cc. 513-514, 1265-1266, 1458, 1459; H.C. Vol. 679
cc. 886-895
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reform through the medium of a Convention agreed by a body to
which neither Canada nor Australia at that time belonged.8 3 Reform
of the law of domicile provides a less happy illustration of the
impact that international agreement may have on national law
reform.8 4 Criticism of the English rules as to domicile can be found
throughout the first half of this century;8 5 but no steps were taken to
reform the law until a draft Convention was agreed by the Hague
Conference in 1951 'pour r~gler les conflits entre la loi nationale et
la loi du domicile'. In December 1952 the Lord Chancellor invited
the newly created Private International Law Committee to consider
whether amendment of the law of domicile was desirable and
whether the United Kingdom should accede to the draft Hague
Convention. The Committee answered both questions in the
affirmative. 8 6 Attempts were made to implement the Committee's
proposals but the draft Bills provoked powerful opposition; they
were abandoned and the matter referred back to the Private
International Law Committee which repeated its support for the
original reform proposals but acknowledged that substantial
opposition to the proposals had been generated and whether any
further law reform action should be taken was a matter of policy on
which the Committee made no recommendation. 8 7 No further
action was taken and len years' law reform activity petered out, a
sad end to the story 8 However, had it not been for the work of the
Hague Conference, the question of reform of domicile might never
have been taken up at all: 'Britain's desire to modify the complex
English concept of domicile derived from her aspiration to become a
party to the convention.' 8 9
VII. Substance or Procedure?
Conventions which make procedural improvements in the interna-
83. And see Vitta, Hague Recueil des cours 126 (1969 1, 113, 184-186
84. Ibid, at 183-184
85. E.g. Foster, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws" (1935),
16 B.Y.B.I.L. 84, 84-88; Morris, Cases on Private International Law, 1st ed.
(1939), at 22; Wolff, Private International Law, 1st ed. (1945), at 122-124;
Cheshire, "The International Validity of Divorces" (1945), 61 L.Q.R. 352,
363-364; Cheshire, Private International Law, 4th ed. (1952), at 182-184
86. Final Report of the Private International Law Committee (1954) Cmd. 9068
87. Seventh Report of the Private International Law Committee (1963), Cmnd.
1955; and see Mann, (1959), 8 I.C.L.Q. 457; (1963), 12 I.C.L.Q. 1326
88. Van Hoogstraten, "The United Kingdom Joins an Uncommon Market: The
Hague Conference on Private International Law" (1963), 12 I.C.L.Q. 148, 159
89. Vitta, Hague Recueil des cours 126 (1969 1) 113, 184
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tional administration of justice, improvements which require
reciprocal international agreement, have proved to be some of the
most successful Hague Conventions in terms of ratifications and
three such conventions have been ratified by the United Kingdom. 90
They are the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (1961), 91 the Conven-
tion on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (1965)92 and the
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (1970). 93 The first of these, which abolished
the need for any diplomatic or consular legalisation of foreign
public documents, was a procedural simplification which came into
effect in England in 1965 without the need for any legislative
measures. 94 The second of these Conventions provides a simplified
process for the service of documents, both judicial and extra-
judicial, from one Contracting State to another. The United
Kingdom brought this Convention into force in 1969 by means of
amendment to the Rules of the Supreme Court9 5 - no primary
legislation was necessary. The third of these essentially procedural
Conventions is that on the taking of evidence abroad which came
into force in the United Kingdom in 1976 with the passage of the
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975. Not only
does the 1975 Act implement the Convention, it lays down a
complete code for the taking of evidence in any part of the United
Kingdom on behalf of courts elsewhere in the United Kingdom or
abroad. So its scope is much wider than that of the Convention.
Provisions on the taking of evidence abroad existed in a number of
bilateral conventions which the United Kingdom had concluded
with other states; so there was no great novelty in the 1969
90. The United Kingdom is not a party to one of the most successful of all, the
1954 Convention on Civil Procedure, which has been ratified by 20 Member States
and acceded to by another 7 non-member states.
91. Ratified by 15 Member States and acceded to by 13 non-member states
92. Ratified by 16 Member States and acceded to by 3 non-member states
93. Ratified by 12 Member States and acceded to by 1 non-member state
94. See The Supreme Court Practice 1979, Vol.I, 38/10/3. English law has no
conception of the legalisation of documents and the convention has had the effect of
reducing the requirement elsewhere - a development welcomed by English
lawyers: see Wortley, "Great Britain and the Movement for the Unification of
Private Law since 1948" (1958), 32 Tul. L. Rev. 541, 545; and see Amram,
"Toward Easier Legalisation of Foreign Public Documents" (1974), 60 American
Bar Association Journal 310
95. See now R.S.C.O. 11, r.5. Other similar bilateral conventions have been
implemented under R.S.C. 0. 11, r.6.
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Convention. Even though its provisions were less liberal than those
of some of the bilateral conventions, ratification of it could lead to
the United Kingdom having reciprocal arrangements on this topic
with a wider range of countries. 96
The passage through Parliament of the Bill which later became
the 1975 Act was without incident and almost without debate.
97 It
was pointed out that English law as regards the taking of evidence
for foreign proceedings was in need of reform and modernisation
and so the Hague Convention provided the impetus for legislation to
reform and codify the law on this topic and to widen the scope of
international co-operation by implementing the Convention. 98 This
provides another example of the relative ease with which
international procedural law reform can be implemented and of the
significant contribution that the Hague Conference has made to this
aspect of private international law. It ought, however, to be
mentioned that the 1975 Act has since proved to be more
contentious than perhaps Parliament realised at the time. The House
of Lords99 has since refused to permit the procedures of the Act to
be used to enable testimony to be taken in England for the purposes
of anti-trust proceedings in the U.S.A., where there was a danger of
the witnesses to be questioned incriminating themselves so far as
possible later American proceedings were concerned, and where to
allow the evidence to be given would be regarded as prejudicial to
the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. 100
Procedural conventions may owe their success to a number of
factors. Reform of the machinery for dealing with cross-border legal
issues requires uniform international procedures and harmonisation
to a much greater extent than does reform of substantive choice of
law rules. It may be possible to implement procedural reforms
without primary legislation, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of the
legislative timetable. Finally, civil servants who have to operate the
procedural machinery may subconsciously be more receptive to
reforms which ease the burdens of their lives than those which deal
with matters of substance, and it may be that the consent of their
political masters to procedural changes is obtained with greater
ease.
96. Edwards, (1969), 18 I.C.L.Q. 619, 646
97. Hansard, H.C. Vol.884, cc. 2208-2210; H.L. Vol. 360, cc. 34-42
98. Hansard, H.C. Vol.884, c. 2210; and see H.L. Vol. 360, c.40
99. Re Wfestinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547
100. Ibid., at 615-617, 630-632, 639-640, 650-651
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VIII. Too many cooks?
There is one other Hague Convention substantially of a
procedural kind which the United Kingdom has ratified and
implemented very recently, namely the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance
Obligations (1973). 101 Under this Convention, decisions given in
one Contracting State in respect of a wide range of maintenance
obligations must be recognised and enforced in the other
Contracting States provided certain jurisdictional criteria are
satisfied, the most significant being the habitual residence or
nationality of either the maintenance debtor or creditor, or the
defendant's submission to the jurisdiction. 10 2 Subject to certain
grounds of non-recognition, such as that the decision was obtained
by fraud or is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State
where enforcement is sought, 10 3 the foreign order is in principle to
be enforced as if it were an order of the State addressed.
This Convention provides not only a further example of the
greater ease with which procedural reforms may be implemented
but also a good illustration of a problem which is ever increasing in
the area of international law reform generally, that of 'too many
cooks'. There may be widespread acceptance that 'something must
be done' about a particular problem, with the result that there is
pressure to include the problem on the agenda of a number of law
reform bodies, and perhaps on the agenda for bilateral intergovern-
ment discussions. The result is a series of schemes for
improvement, all of which may have considerable merit but
differing scope. There may then be pressures of different kinds for
the acceptance of some or all of these schemes. Those who have
conducted successful bilateral reciprocal negotiations with another
state wish to see the concluded agreement implemented; active
participation by one's national delegation in more broadly based
international discussions which lead to an acceptable convention
also generates a force for implementation. If all the schemes are
based on reciprocity and each scheme covers a relatively small
number of countries, indeed perhaps only two countries, improve-
ment of the law is achieved by piecemeal implementation. There is
101. It was ratified by the United Kingdom on 1 March 1980 and was implemented
by The Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (Hague Convention




a price for such improvement in terms of the coherent structure of
the law and in terms of the complexity which practising lawyers
must master, often at the financial expense of their clients.
This problem may be illustrated by the present state of English
law on recognition of foreign maintenance orders after the bringing
into force of the Hague Maintenance Obligations Convention of
1973. Maintenance orders made in Scotland and Northern Ireland
can be registered and enforced in England under the Maintenance
Orders Act 1950;104 orders made in a large number of
Commonwealth countries may be registered and enforced in
England under the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement)
Act 1920; recognition of orders made in other Commonwealth and a
range of non-Commonwealth countries falls under Part I of the
Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972. Part II of
that Act implements the United Nations Convention on the
Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (1956) and provides a different
set of procedures for enforcement of the orders of countries which
are parties to that Convention. Some countries fall within more than
one r6gime' 05 , but it is assumed that the most efficacious one will
be used. That is not an end to this complexity because there is
provision under section 40 of the 1972 Act for special reciprocal
arrangements to be made with individual countries and for these
arrangements to be brought into force by statutory instrument. This
provision now covers recognition of maintenance orders from the
Republic of Ireland, a majority of states of the U.S.A. and the states
which are parties to the 1973 Hague Convention. The implementa-
tion of that Convention was made relatively easy by the existence of
the appropriate machinery for delegated legislation; though section
40 provides a very wide reaching power to rewrite a large
proportion of the 1972 Act. The statutory instrument implementing
the Hague Convention amounts to a statement that so far as
recognition of the orders from Contracting States are concerned, the
first twenty-four sections of the 1972 Act shall be either amended or
disapplied and, indeed, the delegated legislation contains a
completely redrafted Part I of the 1972 Act.
The result is that a solicitor wishing to advise on the recognition
of a foreign maintenance order has to decide whether it falls within
the regimes provided by two multilateral international conventions,
104. s. 16
105. E.g. Barbados, France, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland fall under both
Parts I and II of the 1972 Act.
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a whole series of bilateral reciprocal agreements, inter UK
legislation or the common law. 10 6 It cannot be said that the addition
of the six countries parties to the 1973 Hague Convention creates
this complexity, but recognition of maintenance orders does provide
a striking example of the results of piecemeal reform stemming
from different international agreements. A variety of schemes may
in some cases be inevitable because of the differing reciprocal needs
of different countries; but from the point of view of simplicity and
certainty, the fewer the separate schemes the better.
A further example of the complexity that may stem from a variety
of concurrent initiatives all dealing with the same serious problem is
provided by an item on the agenda for the 1980 Session of the
Hague Conference - child kidnapping and the recognition of
foreign custody orders. Seen from a United Kingdom point of view,
this topic is the subject of at least four separate initiatives. The Law
Commission and Scottish Law Commission published a working
paper in 1976107 dealing with both jurisdiction over and recognition
of custody orders within the United Kingdom and agreement has
now been reached on the major policy issues for the preparation of a
final report. The Council of Europe concluded a Convention on the
recognition and enforcement of decisions concerning custody and
on restoration of custody of children which was signed by the
United Kingdom in May 1980. A draft Convention on the civil
aspects of international child abduction has been prepared by a
Special Commission of the Hague Conference which is to be
submitted to the main session of the conference in October 1980 and
active interest has been expressed by the Commonwealth
Secretariat'0 8 and a number of member states of the Common-
wealth, including Canada, in the preparation of a scheme to deal at
least with child kidnapping. There has even been some initiative
within the E.E.C. to provide at least special administrative
machinery for dealing with the recognition and enforcement of
custody orders of the courts of the Member States of the E.E.C.
Everyone agrees that there is a pressing social problem to be
resolved - as international travel becomes relatively cheaper the
106. For a fuller account of the present position, see Law Commission Working
Paper No. 77 (1980): Financial Relief after Foreign Divorce, Appendix.
107. Law Commission Working Paper No. 68; Scottish Law Commission
Memorandum No. 23 (1976)
108. See The International Abduction of Children by a Parent or Guardian,
(1980), a paper prepared by J. M. Eekelaar for the Commonwealth Secretariat
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problem gets greater. Agreement on the solutions is, however,
much more difficult.
There are significant differences between the two major
initiatives: the Council of Europe Convention and the draft Hague
Convention. The former deals primarily with the recognition and
enforcement of all child custody orders and is subject to no
mandatory time limit. The Hague Convention deals only with cases
of improper removal, i.e. child kidnapping, and proceedings must
be initiated within six months of the improper removal. To that
extent its scope is narrower than that of the Council of Europe
Convention; but in one important respect its scope is broader, for it
applies to all cases of improper removal, whether or not there has
been a prior court order. A further difference between the two
conventions is that, under the draft Hague Convention, the power of
the court to refuse to return a child who has been improperly
removed is exercisable on different and more restricted grounds
than those applicable under the Council of Europe Convention.
While concurrent initiatives create complexity, it is not a
complete answer to say that only one body should deal with the
topic or that a State which is a member of more than one of these
international bodies should wait and see what they all produce and
then choose one of them. There are two reasons for treating such
solutions with caution. The first is that of the membership of the
bodies. The Hague Conference has twenty nine members; the
Council of Europe a slightly smaller number. Some countries are
members of both bodies; others are not. Maximum international
agreement can only be achieved by implementing both Conven-
tions, provided they are not incompatible. Furthermore, there are
often strong political pressures against adopting a wait and see
attitude. Foreign ministries may well take a different view of the
merits of a convention from that taken by lawyers. If a convention
does no harm and some good, why wait for the possibility of a better
one if international goodwill may be realised by signing and indeed
ratifying the present one? There is also a more direct political
pressure in a subject as emotive as custody disputes. Members of
Parliament are often able to produce instances where one of their
constituents is at the moment unable to recover a child but would
have been able to do so if a particular convention was in force. It is
not an unreasonable reaction of a government to act quickly to stop
the problem recurring - but the result may once again be piecemeal
and complicated international law reform.
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The agenda for the 1980 Session of the Hague Conference
provides another example of a difficulty created by several bodies
operating in the same field. This time the clash is between the work
of the Hague Conference and that of the E.E.C. in the field of
contractual choice of law rules. After about ten years of negotiations
the nine Member States of the E.E.C. have agreed on a Convention
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. This convention
was concluded in Rome on 19 June 1980 and has so far been signed
by all the Member States except Denmark and the United Kingdom.
It provides a new set of choice of law rules in contract for all cases,
whether or not connected with the E.E.C., coming before the courts
of the Member States. This E.E.C. initiative in the reform and
harmonisation of the conflict of laws has been attacked' 0 9 as
tending to supplant the work of the Hague Conference with its more
broadly based membership and indeed the fact that work was
progressing in the E.E.C. context seems to have been a major factor
contributing to the decision of the Hague Conference in 1976 not to
take up the suggestion of working on a contract choice of law
convention110 . Criticism of this clash of interests has been forceful.
"The Common Market has apparently chosen to pre-empt for itself
codification of the rules of conflict of laws, thus blocking the
Hague Conference from doing the job for which it was created.
This is a heavy responsibility. Having the Conference operate at
the Market's pleasure, to pick up crumbs here and there is not
likely to appeal to the other member States". 11'
The problem is not, however, limited to future work of the
Conference but extends to the existing Conventions. The E.E.C.
contract convention lays down choice of law rules applicable to all
international contracts: but it also preserves other international
conventions to which Member States are parties."12 The most
significant of these is the 1955 Hague Convention on the law
applicable to international sale of goods. Sale of goods is probably
the most important international contract and four Member States of
the E.E.C." 3 are parties to the 1955 Convention. As this
Convention prevails over the E.E.C. Convention, the harmonisation
objective of the latter is defeated if about half the Member States of
109. Nadelmann, "Clouds over International Efforts to Unify Rules of Conflict of
Laws" (1977), 1 Law and Contemporary Problems (No. 2) 54, 64-71
110. Ibid. at 65-69
111. Ibid. at71
112. Art. 21
113. Belgium, Denmark, France and Italy
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the E.E.C. apply the choice of law rules of the 1955 Convention to
the most important international contract. The result has been a
desire on the part of those E.E.C. States not parties to the 1955
Hague Convention that the others should denounce it. Indeed, even
if all the Member States of the E.E.C. became parties to the Hague
Convention, a significant element of harmonisation would be
lacking because different choice of law rules would apply to sale of
goods contracts and to other contracts; this would lead to great
complexity, especially with regard to those transactions which
combine sale of goods with other obligations, There is, however, a
desire at the Hague Conference to attract wider acceptance of
internationally agreed choice of law rules for sale which is
manifested by the inclusion on the agenda for the 1980 Session of a
draft convention, adopted in 1979 by a Special Commission, on the
law applicable to certain consumer sales.
This competition between law reform proposals in the field of
obligations 114 is likely, in my opinion, to have the result that the
United Kingdom will not now sign the 1955 Hague Sales
Convention, 1 5 or whatever revision of it or whatever consumer
sales convention emerges from the 1980 Session of the Hague
Conference. Similar conflict is to be seen between the Hague
Conference and the E.E.C. in the field of tort law. The United
Kingdom has signed neither the Hague Traffic Accidents
Convention of 1971 nor the Products Liability Convention of 1973
and is, in my view, most unlikely to do so at least while negotiations
on a choice of law convention on non-contractual obligations are
proceeding in the E.E.C.
IX. The Dangers of compromise
Reform of the law on a national basis has a major advantage over
reform through an international agency - the need for compromise
is much reduced. It is not entirely eliminated. Legislative
acceptability may require some compromises to be made. Where the
state involves more than one legal system, as in both the United
114. There is the possibility of even wider conflict as the Eleventh Session of
UNCITRAL, meeting in 1978, decided to include unification of conflict rules for
international sales on its programme of future work, though with no particular
priority until it was seen whether the Hague Conference revised the 1955
Convention.
115. For criticism of the Convention, see Jacobson, "International Sales of
Goods" (1954), 3 I.C.L.Q. 659
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Kingdom and Canada, there may be conflicting views necessitating
skilled reconciliation. However, international bodies with a
membership representing fundamentally different legal and political
systems can usually only reach agreement by means of substantial
compromise - certainly if there is to be any real hope of
widespread acceptance of the agreement or Convention which
emerges. Sometimes this process of compromise is wholly
beneficial in that it provides international respectability for the
abandonment of criticised national rules which might not otherwise
be achieved. A striking illustration of this is the ever increasing use
by the Hague Conference of habitual residence as a connecting
factor to bridge the gap between the common law world's reliance
on domicile and the civil law systems' dependence on nationality.
Indeed this has led in the United Kingdom to much wider
acceptance of habitual residence as a connecting factor, even
outside the Hague Conventions in which it originated. Domicile has
not been abandoned but has become an alternative connecting factor
to habitual residence in, for example, the rules as to the jurisdiction
of the courts over matrimonial causes. 11
6
Compromise can, on the other hand, lead to unsatisfactory
solutions which satisfy no-one, a 'lowest common denominator'
approach to law reform. This can take two forms. The first is the use
of reservations. Agreement may only be reached in negotiations by
making some provision optional, by giving a State the power to
declare that it will not apply the rule. A striking example of this is
Part I of the 1976 Hague Marriage Convention whose rules as to the
celebration of marriages in the forum state are optional. 117 A
random glance at the last eight Hague Conventions shows that all
but two contain powers of reservation. The wider the powers and
their exercise, the less international uniformity that is achieved,
though such uniformity is itself the mainspring of reform on the
international, rather than the national, plane.
There is a real danger that governments, legislators and law
reformers may say: 'If that is the best international uniformity you
can get, we would rather have domestic law reform without the
uniformity'. One must remember, before criticising that reaction
too severely, that implementation of a Hague Convention is no
guarantee of widespread uniformity. Statistically, the twenty-six
116. Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973
117. See Art. 16
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conventions concluded in the post-war period average about six
ratifications per convention. Indeed some international uniformity
may be achieved even via unilateral reform in that other
similar-minded jurisdictions in, for example, the common law
world might choose to adopt some or all of the changes made in
another jurisdiction. The greater the co-operation between different
law reform agencies, the more likely this is to happen.
The other form in which compromise may be seen is in the
formulation of very complex rules. The particular problem which
worries one State or group of States and which cannot be
accommodated in the general rule is made the subject of an
exception, and then the exceptions grow. Similarly, compromise
between certainty and the desire to have a different outcome
depending on the various law/fact patterns involved leads to
complexity. Both of these approaches are illustrated by the two
fairly recent Hague conventions in the field of tort law. The Traffic
Accidents Convention (1971) has, in Article 3, a general choice of
law rule that the internal law of the State where the accident
occurred is to be applied. Ensuing articles provide a long list of
exceptions to this rule depending on the origins of the vehicle and of
the parties. 1 8 The Products Liability Convention (1973) does not
even start with a simple basic rule but applies the law of the State of
the place of injury only if that State is also either the plaintiff's
habitual residence, the defendant's principal place of business or the
place where the plaintiff acquired the product. 119 Again, further
exceptions then follow. These rules amount to an attempt to identify
the most likely factual circumstances to arise and the law that would
be applicable under a flexible general proper law approach and then
to cast those solutions in the form of specific rules. A structure of
complex rules is inevitable. They are likely to look even more
complex when transposed into the statutory form necessary in the
United Kingdom for their implementation and I suspect that this is
one, at least, of the reasons why the United Kingdom has neither
signed nor ratified either of these conventions. As Cavers has
suggested, 'the proper law of the tort is an artifact that courts are
118. For Canadian criticism of the complexity of this Convention, see Castel and
Cr~peau, "International developments in choice of law governing torts: Views
from Canada" (1971), 18 Am.Jo. Comp. Law 17, 23-25. Other defects are
indicated by Newman, "The Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents" (1969), 18
I.C.L.Q. 643
119. Art. 4
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better qualified to fashion than conventions'. 120
X. Conclusions
In the Preface to the first edition of his Private International Law,
Geoffrey Cheshire gave as one of the fascinations of the subject that
'it has been only lightly touched by the paralysing hand of the
Parliamentary draftsman'. What was true in 1935 is, as we have
seen, much less true today, paradoxically because we live in an age
of institutional law reform. The fact that the product of the work of
such bodies, whether national or international, is ultimately
legislation means that the new rules of law are cast in the statutory
concrete of Acts of Parliament. However, rules designed to serve
the interests and legal systems of a wide variety of states are most
likely to be successful when they avoid the complexity of much
modern legislation; when they lay down general rules, not
overcluttered with detailed exceptions. Changing patterns in society
and in commerce suggest that flexibility is a virtue - especially as
amendment of internationally agreed conventions can only be
achieved by the slow process of further international negotiation.
The United Kingdom's experience of the Hague Conventions has
been that complicated conventions stand less chance of implementa-
tion than simple ones; that conventions designed to simplify the
international administration of justice have proved more acceptable
than those concerned with substantive conflict of laws rules; that
conventions which fulfil an existing need for reform are more likely
to be implemented than those whose main objective is seen to be
change in the interests of international harmonisation; and, finally,
that the increase in the number of bodies concerned with law reform
in the international context has led inevitably to a lessening of the
impact of the work of the Hague Conference and to increased
complexity in the law when the rules of Hague Conventions have to
be dovetailed in with the reforms proposed by other bodies.
One problem that the United Kingdom does not face is that posed
by a federal constitutional system. Many areas of the conflict of
laws in Canada fall within provincial rather than federal legislative
jurisdiction. On a number of occasions Canadian authors 121 have
120. Cavers, "The Proper Law of Producer's Liability" (1977), 26 I.C.L.Q. 703,
728. For forceful criticism of the complexity of the Products Liability Convention,
see Tebbens, International Product Liability, at 333-360
121. E.g. Kos-Rabcewitz-Zubkowski, "The possibilities for treaties on private
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suggested that the most practicable means of giving effect in Canada
to Hague Conventions is by model laws rather than by formal
ratification and implementation. 122 The disadvantage with such an
approach is that, while some Hague Conventions though cast in the
form of treaties are in essence sets of upiform rules, others apply in
terms only to relations with the other Contracting States. This
disadvantage is not always insuperable if a country is prepared to
abandon the element of reciprocity involved. For example the
Divorce Recognition Convention of 1970 only applies to the
recognition in one Contracting State of divorces and legal
separations obtained in another Contracting State. Nevertheless, the
United Kingdom legislation implementing that Convention
123
applies to all foreign divorces and legal separations no matter where
obtained and including grounds of recognition 124 wider than those
in the Convention. 125 Where, however, reciprocal machinery is
required model laws provide no answer. 126
Horace Read was more enthusiastic over model laws, as might
befit a long-serving member of the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, and it is perhaps
international law to serve as model laws" (1966), 26 R. du B. 229; Castel,
"Canada and the Hague Conference on Private International Law: 1893-1967"
(1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 1, 10-19; Proceedings of the Fifty-Second Annual
Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in
Canada (1970) at 157-214; Lederman, "The Private International Law System:
Some Thoughts on Objectives, Methods and Relations to Public International Law"
in Canadian Perspectives on International Last, and Organisation (ed. MacDonald,
Morris, Johnston) (1974) 137, at 147-150
122. For discussion of the attempts to persuade the Hague Conference to produce
model laws rather than international treaties, and of the merits of the two
approaches, see Nadelmann & Reese, "The American Proposal at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law to Use the Method of Uniform Laws"
(1958), 7 Am. Jo. Comp. Law 239; Nadelmann, "Uniform Legislation vs.
International Conventions", in International Trade Arbitration (ed. Domke)
(1958) 167; Amram, "Uniform Legislation as an Effective Alternative to the
Treaty Technique" (1960), 54 Proceedings of Am. Soc. of Int. Law 62; Droz, "La
conference de la Haye de droit international priv6 et les m6thodes d'unification de
droit: trait~s internationaux ou lois modles?", [1961] Rev. int. de droit compar6
507; Nadelmann, "Uniform Legislation versus International Conventions
Revisited" (1968), 16 Am. Jo. Comp. Law 28
123. Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971
124. Ibid., s.6
125. The United Kingdom took advantage of Article 17 of the Convention which
permits a Contracting State to have rules more favourable to recognition than those
in the Convention.
126. E.g. under the Convention concerning the International Administration of the
Estates of Deceased Persons (1973)
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appropriate to conclude this lecture with his view, expressed in
1969, on the way in which Canada could best gain the advantages of
membership of the Hague Conference. He said:
"In this country the advantages of membership in the Hague
Conference could be better gained, not by formal adherence to
the conventions but by active participation in its work and use of
its conventions as models for uniform acts. In this way, perhaps
with an occasional slight departure from uniformity, greater
flexibility and adaptability to conditions peculiar to this country
could be ensured". 127
127. The Ansul, (Dalhousie University Law School) January 1969
